Digital Technology as a Challenge to European Contract Law by Grundmann, Stefan & Hacker, Philipp
Articles
Stefan Grundmann and Philipp Hacker*
Digital Technology as a Challenge to
European Contract Law
From the Existing to the Future Architecture
https://doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2017-0012
Abstract: Offering an overview of the interactions between digital technologies
and contract law, we identify three pillars in this architecture: the regulatory
framework; digital interventions over the life cycle of the contract; and digital
objects of contracting. The regulatory framework, which itself may draw on digital
technology to effectively pursue its ends, shapes, and is shaped by, the other two
pillars. More specifically, on the one hand, we show how four key technologies –
digital platforms, Big Data analytics, artificial intelligence, and blockchain – are
being used at different stages of the contractual process (from the screening for
contractual partners to formation, enforcement and interpretation) and engender
novel market dynamics that, in many instances, necessitate regulatory responses.
On the other hand, digitally facilitated contracting increasingly relates to digital
content as the object of the contract; however, while this area has notably been the
subject of the proposedDirective on Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content and
thus has received some first ‘European structure’, we argue that a number of
important blind spots remain that fail to be addressed by the directive. All in all,
the use of digital technology in contracting will likely reinforce an adaptive,
relational viewandpractice of contracting. This increased fluidity engenders a vast
potential for preference-conforming, time-sensitive contracts; however, to the
extent that it also mirrors novel asymmetries of information and power, the order-
ingmechanisms of the lawmay simultaneously bemore needed than ever.
*Corresponding author: Philipp Hacker,MaxWeber Fellow, European University Institute,
and Postdoctoral Fellow, Humboldt-University of Berlin, Germany,
E-Mail: philipp.hacker@rewi.hu-berlin.de
Stefan Grundmann, Professor of Transnational Private Law, European University Institute, and
Chair for German, European and International Private and Business Law, Humboldt-University of
Berlin, Germany, E-Mail: stefan.grundmann@rewi.hu-berlin.de
ERCL 2017; 13(3): 255–293
I Challenges and Core Features of an
‘Architecture’
Digital technology and its challenges and repercussions for contract law in
Europe – or: European Contract Law – are not a narrow issue. This article is
not about one particular research question – even though in a good number of
single questions, we shall propose novel solutions. Rather, this article is about
an overall picture, the idea being that European Contract Law and its develop-
ment undergo important changes as a consequence of the mere existence of
a digital arena with its particular factual problems. Digital technology is, of
course, not a uniform concept; rather, it comprises a set of different technolo-
gies whose impact on contract law will sometimes be similar, but which may
at other times also diverge. In this survey, we focus on the impact of digital
platforms; Big Data analytics; artificial intelligence; and blockchain technol-
ogy. We intend to show not only that new problems require additional solu-
tions, but also – and more importantly – that traditional contract law concepts
will have to be revisited. Thus, we do not only see the advantage of sketching
out the arena for readers less ‘specialized’ in problems of digital technology
and contracting, but as well in pointing to core cases where traditional con-
tract law concepts need reconsideration, and in clarifying the interplay of the
large bodies of the law pertinent to contracting and contract contents in the
digital arena. This implies as well that many individual questions could and
can be deepened, and that each scholar will have a slightly different opinion
on the range of single questions that are paradigmatic for the overall picture
and thus deserve being brought into this survey – and probably even more
so on the range of literature to be selected and found helpful for further
research.
It may therefore be wise to specify three things in a bird’s eye view first: (i)
what kind of contract law and contract law perspective we are mainly interested
in; (ii) what vision of ‘European Contract Law’ we base our discussion on; and,
finally, (iii) what the main thrust of the paper is.
1 Which Place for Contract Law in the Digital Arena?
We see regulation as an (important) integrative part of contract law, while conced-
ing that – in the ordo-liberal tradition that dominated the creation of the Rome
Treaty system – they are quite different in aim: regulation primarily furthers the
public interest, and genuine private and contract law deals primarily with the
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adequate balance of individual, private party interests.1 Despite this, however, we
see them as strongly functionally linked. We even want to suggest that (a large
part of) the regulatory body nowadays is more intimately nested into genuine
private law issues or regimes than it was in the concept of the ordo-liberal school
when the relation between contract and regulation was first conceptualised – but
where both regimes were quite neatly kept apart.2 Finally, not including regula-
tion – and even not including it very prominently – would also mean not includ-
ing that part of the regime where EU Law in the technical sense is strongest. In
fact, if one distinguishes between regulatory parts of the regime and private law
parts of it, the latter is more often still national – or mainly national –, while the
former is mostly enacted at the EU level.3 Furthermore, a good part of the most
1 See references next footnote. The term of ‘regulation’ is used, of course, in different ways. In the
Anglo-American tradition, namely in contract law, often it is used also more broadly in the sense
that ‘regulating contracts’ is more directly focused on the impact which a particular way of
shaping contract law has on society, while traditional contract law was more about system
building, doctrinal explanation and individual balancing of interests. Path-breaking for this
broader concept of regulating contracts: H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999). The sharper separation advocated by the ordo-liberal school has, however, not
only the advantage of having influenced the shape of the Treaty of Rome somuch, but as well that
of a conceptual clarity with respect to one main question: which interests do particular areas of
law foster primarily? As can be seen in the following paragraphs, this does, however, by nomeans
exclude considering public interest regulation also in the context of a discussion of classical
contract law, ie of making their interplay a prime topic.
2 F. Böhm, ʻPrivatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaftʼ ORDO 17 (1966) 75–151; translation
(and discussion) in S. Grundmann, H. Micklitz and M. Renner, Private Law Theory – Global,
European, Social Sciences Based (Antwerp/Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017) chapter 6 (forthcoming);
discussion and in part further development of the theory: E.-J. Mestmäcker, ‘Macht – Recht –
Wirtschaftsverfassungʼ Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) 137 (1973)
97–111; E.-J. Mestmäcker, ʻAuf demWeg zu einer Ordnungspolitik für Europaʼ, in E.-J. Mestmäcker
(ed), Eine Ordnungspolitik für Europa, Festschrift für Hans von der Groeben zu seinem 80. Geburts-
tag (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987) 9–49; translation (and discussion) of this last text in Grundmann
et al (this note above) chapter 24; see also S. Grundmann, ʻThe Concept of the Private Law Society
after 50 Years of European and European Business Lawʼ European Review of Private Law (ERPL)
2008, 553–581; G. Schnyder and M. Siems, ‘Ordoliberal Variety of Neoliberalism’, in S. Konzel-
mann and M. Fovargue-Davies (eds), Banking Systems in the Crisis: the Faces of Liberal Capitalism
(London / NewYork: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013) 250–268.
3 On this disposition of bodies of the law, see path-breaking, Ch. Kirchner, ‘Europäisches Ver-
tragsrecht’, in L. Weyers (ed), Europäisches Vertragsrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997) 103–137 at
106 (he therefore characterises European contract law as ‘harmonisation coming from the edges’);
more broadly S. Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’ European Review of
Private Law 2001, 505–528; Grundmann (end of next note); and also C. Quigley, European Commu-
nity Contract Law (London et al.: Kluwer, 1997); J. Basedow, ‘A Common Contract Law for the
CommonMarket’ (1996) 33 CommonMarket Law Review 1169–1195.
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innovative ideas in the last half century have been developed – at least for
German law – in areas which really constitute cross-sections of several areas. The
‘creation’ of a banking law is an example in point, the one of a capital market law
another one.4 Finally, when it comes to input from the social sciences into law, we
are inclined to think that at least economic theory (information economics, game
theory), new economic sociology with its network analysis,5 behavioural insights
(including behavioural economics)6 and more generally theories of choice,
namely also of collective choice are paramount – with all these theoretical
4 One may name here competition law as well, as it really is about how to supplement contract
and company law with a regime which helps to guarantee the best material freedom possible
(regulation and private law); see references last footnote. For a comprehensive view on the
interplay between competition law (more generally business regulation in its interplay with
traditional private law): W. Fikentscher, Wirtschaftsrecht (Munich: Beck, 1983) (2 volumes on
German and European Business Regulation Law); E. J. Mestmäcker and H. Schweitzer, Euro-
päisches Wettbewerbsrecht (3rd ed, Munich: Beck, 2014); see also W. Fikentscher, Ph. Hacker and
R. Podzun, FairEconomy. Crises, Culture, Competition and the Role of Law (Heidelberg et al:
Springer, 2013). More recently and more focused on the relationship (as such) between regulation
and private law: A. Hellgarth, Regulierung und Privatrecht – Staatliche Verhaltenssteuerungmittels
Privatrecht und ihre Bedeutung für Rechtswissenschaft, Gesetzgebung und Rechtsanwendung (Tü-
bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016); S. Grundmann, ʻPrivatrecht und Regulierungʼ, in Festschrift for
Canaris II (forthcoming, also in English in the European Review of Private Law).
5 On network theory and its relationship to digital technology (Internet, platforms, network
effects for the digital economy like Google etc), see (with particular attention to private law and
regulation) F. Idelberger, ‘Connected Contracts Reloaded’, in S. Grundmann (ed), European Con-
tract Law in the Digital Age (Antwerp: Intersentia, forthcoming); A. Wright and P. de Filippi,
‘Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia’, https://ssrn.com/abstr
act=2580664, 15–17; 30–33 and 54–56; V. Buterin, ‘DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete
Terminology Guide’, Ethereum Blog (6 May 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-da
cs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/; groundbreaking, of course, for the overall
concept: M. Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol 1: The Rise of the
Network Society (2nd ed, Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2010; 1st ed 1996).
6 On behavioural approaches to problems of the digital dimension – as dealt with in the context
of contract law and regulation – see in particular: R. Calo, ‘Digital Market Manipulation’ 82 Georg
Washington Law Review 995, 1002–1012, 1015–1018 (2014); E. Mik, ‘The Erosion of Autonomy in
Online Consumer Transactions’ 8 Law, Innovation and Technology 1 (2016); N. Helberger, ‘Profil-
ing and Targeting Consumers in the Internet of Things’, in R. Schulze and D. Staudenmayer,
Digital Revolution: Challenges for Contract Law in Practice (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016) 135–161;
Y. Hermstrüwer, Informationelle Selbstgefährdung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016); Ph. Hacker,
‘The Ambivalence of Algorithms. Gauging the Legitimacy of Personalized Law’, in M. Bakhoum et
al (eds), Personal Data in Competition, Consumer Protection and IP Law – Towards a Holistic
Approach? (Springer, forthcoming); Ph. Hacker, ‘Personalizing EU Private Law. From Disclosures
to Nudges andMandates’ (2017) 25 European Review of Private Law 651.
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approaches related to the social sciences now being supplemented, and compli-
cated, by the technical side, including computing (algorithms) and robotics.
For the digital arena, these ideas – namely the intimate link between private
law (contractual drafting), public interest regulation, and the cross-sectional
character of the area – can briefly be described as follows. It is by no means a
completely new phenomenon that an ‘area’ of the law has a mixed structure, with
parts of regulation, parts of traditional contract or property law, parts of private
ordering and standard contract terms, but also part of public supervision. Prob-
ably the most prominent of such cross-sectional system before the ‘contract law
of the digital age’ is banking law, namely investment banking law (with capital
market law). Banking law was of the highest practical importance, but as well a
powerful source of emerging ideas and research mainly in the 1970 s and 1980s –
and similarly capital market law, and both certainly again in these days. Today
the digital economy, and more generally digital technology, are of similar impor-
tance practically speaking – dealing with another key economic factor: informa-
tion – and in their potential as a source of emerging ideas. Digital technology, of
course, raises questions of regulation in many areas, in IP law,7 in the law of
unfair competition,8 with respect to antitrust law.9 Certainly, however, the rela-
tionship between contract law and public interest regulation is one of the most
prominent relationships also in the digital arena. The law of the digital age – now
with respect to the key factor of data and broadly available information – would
seem to play a role analogous to the one which the law of banking and capital
markets plays for the key factor of capital. Again, the relationship to regulation is
omnipresent, and the area is highly cross-sectional. Therefore, it may also not be
astonishing that a good number of very prominent developments of digital
contracting stem from banking and capital market law (see below). The relation-
ship to regulation will be taken up below in greater detail (section II). The cross-
sectional character of the area, however, is similarly important. Mainly contract
law, company law and some of property law come together in banking and capital
7 See, eg, D. Liebenau, ‘What Intellectual Property Can Learn from Online Privacy, and Vice
Versa’ 30 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=28
42447; W. Kerber, ‘A New (Intellectual) Property Right for Non-Personal Data? An Economic
Analysis‘ (2016) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil (GRUR Int) 989;
J. Drexl, ‘Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data – Between Propertisation and Access‘
(2016)Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No 16–13, https://ssrn.co
m/abstract=2862975.
8 Helberger, n 6 above, 153–160.
9 On the latter, see, eg, M. Stucke and A. Grunes,Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016); A. Ezrachi and M. Stucke, Virtual Competition (Cambridge, MA et al:
Harvard University Press, 2016).
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market law, they cut across these areas – with the addition of regulation in the
form of prudential supervision on the institutions and in the form of a market
publicity, integrity and stability regime. By contrast, the law of the digital arena
would seem to be even more multifaceted and dispersed (with elements of super-
vision, but more prominent with antitrust and with data protection law, perhaps
also IP law, as important bodies of public interest regulation). With respect to
contract law, formation, implementation, performance and interpretation, but
also (digital) contents are clearly ‘specific’ whenever digital technology comes in
(see below, sections III and IV).
2 European Contract Law in Particular
We look at digital technology more specifically in European Contract Law; here,
three dimensions are addressed in particular.
a) The EU Substantive Law Basis – Three Lines of Specific Legislation
The first dimension – and in the future perhaps most important one -is that of EU
Law in the technical sense. There are three legal measures mainly with respect to
contract law. All three have considerable importance, develop a certain model
and thus can serve as an ‘anchor’ for the overall considerations on European
Contract Law in the digital age.
The first legal measure is the EC Directive on e-commerce of June 2000 in
which a certain model of formation of contract is enshrined – more specifically:
those mechanisms which were seen as being necessary to adapt the general
model of formation of contract (in the national contract laws) to the particular
environment of electronic contracting, namely adaptations owing to the ‘fluidity’
of the clicks and expressions of will made in this context, the diminished clarity
and the increased ambiguity and possibility of errors.10
10 Dir 2000/31/EC [Directive on electronic commerce]. On this measure, see, for instance,
R. Brownsword, ‘The E-Commerce Directive, Consumer Transactions, and the Digital Single
Market’, in Grundmann (ed), n 5 above, (forthcoming); C. Ramberg, ‘The e-commerce directive
and formation of contract in a comparative perspective’, 26 European Law Review 429–450 (2001);
M. Kightlinger, ‘A Solution to the Yahoo! Problem? The EC E-Commerce Directive as a Model for
International Cooperation on Internet Choice of Law’ 24Michigan Journal of International Law 719
(2003); M. Hellner, ‘The Country of Origin Principle in the E-commerce Directive – A Conflict with
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The second legal measure – more precisely a succession of legal measures –
deals with the distance character of most digital contracting. This dimension was
first regulated in the so-called EC Distance Selling Directive, then reformed and
integrated in the EU Consumer Rights Directive.11 In 2015, this line of legislation
became the object of a broader strategy on the digital economy – extending,
however, also well beyond it.12 In fact, two proposals were based on this strategy
paper, both adopted by the EU Commission on 9 December 2015, the first proposal
referring to online sale of goods13 and thus continuing (and extending) the regime
established in the EC Distance Selling and the EU Consumer Rights Directive. As
the E-Commerce Directive, this line of measures mainly focuses on formation of
contracts (see below section III)
Conversely, the other proposal – the third legal measure (to come) – goes well
beyond known territory. It is based on rules on aspects of the digital arena already
proposed in the project on a Common European Sales Law14 and deals with the
supply of digital content in particular – hence no longer mainly the formation, but
Conflict of Laws’ 12 European Review of Private Law 193 (2004); seemore in detail below section III
3; see also Dir 1999/93/EC.
11 Dir 2011/83/EU [Consumer Rights Directive]; E. Hall, G. Howells and J. Watson, ‘The Consu-
mer Rights Directive – An Assessment of its Contribution to the Development of European
Consumer Contract Law’, (2012) 8 European Review of Contract Law 139–166; S. Grundmann, ‘The
EU Consumer Rights Directive – Optimizing, Creating Alternatives or a Dead-End’ Uniform Law
Review 2013, 98–127; V. Mak, ‘Standards of Protection: In Search of the Average Consumer of EU
Law in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive’ (2011) 19 European Review of Private Law 25–
42.
12 Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM(2015) 192 final; on this strategy paper, see
S. Arnerstål, ‘Licensing digital content in a sale of goods context’ 10 Journal of Intellectual Property
Law& Practice 750–758 (2015).
13 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects
concerning contracts for the online and other distance sales of goods of 9 December 2015, COM
(2015) 635 final; on this proposal (online sales), see, for instance J. Smits, ‘New European Union
Proposals for Distance Sales and Digital Contents Contracts: Fit for Purpose?’ Zeitschrift für
europäisches Privatrecht 2016, 319–324; F. Zoll, ‘The Remedies in the Proposals of the Online Sales
Directive and the Directive on the Supply of Digital Content‘ Journal of European Consumer and
Market Law (EuCML) 2016, 250–254; D. Staudenmayer, ‘Digitale Verträge –Die Richtlinienvorsch-
läge der Europäischen Kommission‘ Zeitschrift für europäisches Privatrecht 2016, 801–831, 806–
825.
14 On these rules in CESL (and as its model: the [Academic] Common Frame of Reference), see,
for instance, H. Eidenmüller et al, ‘The proposal for a regulation on a common European sales
law: Deficits of the most recent textual layer of European contract law’ (2012) 16 Edinburgh Law
Review 301–357, 310–311 and 333; N. Helberger et al, ‘Digital Content Contracts for Consumers’
(2013) 36 Journal of Consumer Policy 37–57, 47–48 and 53.
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the content of the contract and duties based on it.15 In fact, digital content is about
the problem of an object of the contract which poses considerably or even
completely new problems in large quantity: namely non-rivalrous and/or non-
excludable use of the good and questions of compensation; alternative modes of
compensation (namely giving personal data instead of monetary payment); ser-
vices which have strong IP implications, but as well network effects, etc. Digital
contents pose these new problems to a degree that seem to open a truly new
dimension of object of contract and questions of performance.
Besides these three specific measures, EU law for the digital economy con-
sists, however, also of the application of ‘general’ EU law (not specifically focus-
ing on the digital arena) – namely measures of market regulation – to digital
transactions. Thus, for instance, high frequency trading can be tested against the
rules on insider trading in the EU Market Abuse Regulation or rules on market
manipulation in the same legal measure16 or as well be subject of a particular ban
under the stability rules in the new banking supervision architecture.17 And, of
course, high frequency trading – while difficult to understand for traditional
contract law practitioners or scholars and perhaps even for those otherwise deal-
ing with digital contracts – constitutes probably one of the most developed and –
in sheer volume – one of the practically most important algorithmic automations
of contract formation. Another example, crowdfunding – again a new technique
of mass contracting – is mainly about adapting requirements of (EU or national)
capital market law to a changed environment. This environment is characterised
by smaller amounts of investment and often more direct, substantive interest in
the purpose of the investment (other than just an interest in returns). Even though
crowdfunding is not conditional on digital forms of marketing, these are particu-
larly suited for the particular characteristics of this type of investment scheme
15 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects
concerning contracts for the supply of digital content of 9 December 2015, COM(2015) 634 final; on
this proposal (supply of digital content), see, for instance G. Spindler, ‘Contracts for the Supply of
Digital Content’, in Grundmann (ed), n 5 above, (forthcoming); C. Ramberg, ‘Digital Content – A
Digital CESL II: : A Paradigm for Contract Law via the Backdoor?’, in Grundmann (ed), n 5 above,
(forthcoming); references in n 13 above: Smits; Zoll; Staudenmayer, 825–830; see more in detail
below, section IV.
16 On the application of these two regimes to high frequency trading, see, for instance, K. Alex-
ander, ‘Market structures and market abuse’, in G. Caprio, The Handbook of Safeguarding Global
Financial Stability (London, Waltham, San Diego: Elsevier, 2013) 375–385; P. Kasiske, ʻMarktmiss-
bräuchliche Strategien imHochfrequenzhandelʼWertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM) 2014, 1933–1940.
17 On this possibility, see arts 17, 4(1)(40), 2(1)(d)iii MiFID II; and, for instance, N. Moloney, EU
Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (4th ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 525–
530.
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(small amounts, dispersed investors who potentially should, however, be directly
approached over the time of the investment). This example also shows how such
an adaptation was first implemented at the national level and is now proposed at
the EU level.18
b) A Broader Concept of ‘European Contract Law’
The example given last, however, is also telling insofar as it stands for a broader
concept of ‘European Contract Law’. Besides EU lawmeasures, this broader vision
encompasses at least two more types of instruments, models or perspectives.
The first is a comparative law perspective in the EU – for instance on national
measures already taken with respect to crowdfunding. This can be seen as part of
a ‘European Contract Law’ especially if there is an interplay with existing EU law
(capital market requirements set at the EU law level, in other cases EU antitrust
law requirements) or if EU law is emerging in that area (as in the case of
crowdfunding). Similarly, there is a strong ‘European’ dimension whenever there
is a model which may be based on one national law, but circulates in an un-
changed form in all the European Union market or large parts of it. The most
famous example stems probably from company law, the Company Limited by
Shares (Ltd.) under English law – an example again where digital registration is
paramount for the success. For contract law, Hugh Collins has spoken for such
models ‘in circulation across the EU’ of a ‘freedom to circulate documents [ie
models]’.19
A ‘European Contract Law’ in the broad sense may even be emerging or
existing where a distinctly European way of looking at certain problems can be
found or a distinctly European way of drafting particular contracts in the field can
be discerned. How this integrates into a digital market which in many cases may
even be global, is a delicate issue – encompassing conflict of laws issues with
18 On crowdfunding and its regulation (both at national and at EU level), see, for instance,
C. Estevan, ‘Crowdfunding in Europe‘, in Grundmann (ed), n 5 above, (forthcoming); overview on
the crowdfunding national regulation in several EUMember States: T. Aschenbeck-Florange et al,
‘Regulation of crowdfunding in Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy and the impact of the European
single market’, European Crowdfunding Network June 2013, http://eurocrowd.org/wp-content/
blogs.dir/sites/85/2013/06/20130610_Regulation_of_Crowdfunding_ECN_OC.pdf; G. Dorfleitner,
L. Hornuf, M. Schmitt and M. Weber, ‘The Fintech Market in Germany’ (2016), https://papers.ssr
n.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885931.
19 H. Collins, ‘The Freedom to Circulate Documents: Regulating Contracts in Europe, (2004) 10
European Law Journal 787–803; see as well S. Whitaker, ‘On the Development of European
Standard Contract Terms’ (2006) 2 European Review of Contract Law 51–76.
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respect to standard terms, private law and public interest regulation.20 This clash
between (partly) national legal and transnational market is omnipresent in the
digital arena.
3 The Main Pieces of the Architecture
In the following, this wide array of (new) phenomena and – increasingly – also of
rules and legal regimes is structured in a way which is aimed at furthering the
perception of an ‘architecture’ by referring to known structures of contract law. A
first, sharp distinction should be drawn between two different pillars of the
architecture: (i) on the one hand, digital content as the object of contract and, (ii)
on the other hand, the use of digital technologies in a variety of procedures during
the contractual life cycle. Digital content, i.e. digital goods and services, data, and
instruments of storage for digital information in the broader sense, may constitute
the performance or the counter-performance of the contract. Irrespective of this
contractual content, different digital technologies (such as digital platforms; Big
Data analytics; artificial intelligence (AI); or blockchain) also intervene at differ-
ent stages of the contractual life cycle: in the screening of prospective contractual
parties; in drafting the contract; during contract formation; in the definition of
concrete contractual obligations, their continuous development over time, and
their automated enforcement; in the linkage of contracts; and, finally, in contrac-
tual interpretation. Over these different stages, the contractual basis is subjected,
more than in traditional contexts, to the possibility of perpetual adaptation,
revision, and renegotiation via the updating of the information, codes and meth-
ods used by contractual digital technology. These first two pillars thus stand side
by side, but represent the two most important modes of influence that digital
technology can have on contracting: The formation and subsequent development
of contract can be in digital form (via e-mail, internet auction or a digital platform
etc or even via an algorithm triggering transactions); and the content of the
contract can be digital (for instance, a contract on cloud services or on software).
Thus, the contract as tool of regulating the relationship can be digital, but equally
its object, ie, its content.
The first two pillars of the digital architecture of contracts may, but do not
have to come together in a single contract: contracts over the licensing of e-books
20 On the problems of law applicable to digital platforms and transactions, see, for instance,
D. Svantesson, ‘Digital Contracts in Global Surrounding’, in Grundmann (ed), n 5 above, (forth-
coming).
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may be negotiated and concluded in an offline scenario; contracts governing the
sale of old-fashioned, hardcopy books may be initiated, formed and enforced
entirely in the digital world, using technologies that span from Big Data analytics
via digital platforms to AI and blockchain. Besides these two pillars which stand
largely in parallel, a third pillar is found – and like in good futurist architecture,
this pillar does by no means just stand in parallel, but rather intersects with the
first two. This pillar, equally important for an overall understanding and architec-
ture, has to be seen (iii) in the regulatory framework within which private law and
the law made by private parties has to take place. Only by bringing together the
two most important digital phenomena in the area of contracting (the two first
pillars mentioned) with the regulatory framework (also truly multi-facetted), we
may create an overall picture and architecture of ‘Contracting and Contract Law in
the Digital Age’. The regulatory instruments, in turn, may shape the other two
architectural elements with conventional methods of regulation, but they may
also actively harness digital technology to more effectively pursue regulatory
aims.
We deal with the three pillars in the following order: starting out from the
overall framework, ie the regulatory framework (see below section II), followed
by the two – more traditionally contract law related – pillars named first: the
contractual life cycle (see below section III); and the object of the contract (see
below section IV). We thereby take a market approach to the conceptualization of
(European) Contract Law in the digital age.
These parts are strongly interconnected between each other,most prominently
in the following two respects. As already mentioned, the regulatory regime –
regulation, as explained above note 1, focusing primarily on the public interest
such as market structure – is nowadays often intimately nested into private law
regimes. As such, it aims primarily at striking an adequate balance between the
interests of individual private parties. Moreover, in contracts whose basis has been
formed in the digital arena, the formation and the subsequent development of the
contractual basis are often more intimately connected with one another than in
traditional contracting (and in fact often cannot be separated at all).
This is particularly the case for smart contracts built on top of blockchains. A
blockchain essentially is a list (called ledger) that logs transactions, or informa-
tion more generally, in a decentralized way and synchronizes the ledger between
those participating in the network.21 There is no central authority guaranteeing
21 See the ‘founding document’ of blockchain: S. Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic
Cash System’ Bitcoin White Paper (2008); for an overview, see also J. Witte, ‘The Blockchain: A
Gentle Introduction’Working Paper (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2887567.
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the validity of the information in the ledger. Rather, authenticity is secured by (i)
keeping identical copies of the ledger on many participants’ computers (prevent-
ing tampering with past entries); by (ii) allowing only those participants to update
the list that prove (mostly by solving cryptographic puzzles) that they have
invested significant time and effort; and by (iii) requiring validation of these
updates by other participants (preventing tampering with novel entries).22 Block-
chain is the technology that famously undergirds the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, as
well as a growing number of alternative cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum.
Importantly, the Ethereum blockchain not only defines a virtual currency, provid-
ing a means of payment in which direct transactions between network partici-
pants are cryptographically secured; but it also enables smart contracts to run on
its blockchain.23 Smart contracts are computer programs that can receive informa-
tion and assets, as well as send out information and assets.24 Importantly, a smart
contract specifies in advance the exact conditions under which assets will be
distributed to recipients (using, for example, the very cryptocurrency the block-
chain defines).25 Hence, once the conditions are met (and this information is sent
to the smart contract) – for example when a shipment has arrived at its destina-
tion – the corresponding payment is automatically executed. The ‘information’
for the ongoing further development of the smart contract is thus already built
into the preceding phase, ie in the formation of the instrument.26
In this structure that comprises different digital technologies within the three
pillars, the EU law measures named above (Part I 2 a)) – two already existing (of
which one is to be amended soon), a third one just emerging – serve as ‘anchors’.
In fact, over the last 18 months – and certainly once the two proposals of
December 2015 are adopted –, all phases and perspectives named would seem to
be covered substantially also with respect to private law phenomena. This does,
of course, not imply that lacunae do not remain, and even important ones, but
22 Cf A. M. Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin: Unlocking Digital Cryptocurrencies (Beijing et al:
O’Reilly, 2014) 26–28, 176–180.
23 V. Buterin, ‘A next-generation smart contract and decentralized application platform’ Ether-
eumWhite Paper (2014).
24 R. G. Brown, ‘A Simple Model for Smart Contracts’ (10 February 2015), https://gendal.me/2015
/02/10/a-simple-model-for-smart-contracts/; see also Arizona House Bill 2417, Passed 2017-03-29,
Chapter 97, § 2 Article 5 E 2, https://legiscan.com/AZ/text/HB2417/id/1588180/Arizona-2017-H
B2417-Chaptered.html (providing the first legal definition of a smart contract, building on Brown’s
definition).
25 T. Swanson, ‘Consensus-as-a-service: a brief report on the emergence of permissioned, dis-
tributed ledger systems’ (2015) 15, http://www.ofnumbers.com/2015/04/06/consensus-as-a-ser
vice-a-brief-report-on-the-emergence-of-permissioned-distributed-ledger-systems/.
26 See also below, n 35 and accompanying text.
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only that the overall scheme has received its contours at the EU level then as well.
The regulatory side, on the other hand, is strong at the EU level. This is also true
with respect to digital phenomena as in the examples of data protection law,
capital market law, antitrust and unfair competition law that are broad and
thorough. This does not imply that regulation for the digital arena in these areas
of the law cannot be shaped in a more convincing and appropriate way – more
appropriate for digital technology in particular –,27 but a solid basis from which to
start in this endeavour certainly already exists. These anchors – establishing a
certain framework-system already at the EU level, hence for all of Europe – now
allow to distribute also the phenomena accordingly. This includes national views
on other legal issues (comparative law) and supranational practices (private
ordering originating in business practices and terms).28 The latter focus either on
the individual transactions (contracts) or on the establishment and functioning of
platforms on which such contracts can be entered into.
While this article is also about ‘mapping’ the area and the new challenges, we
want to stress mainly the ‘architecture’ in all this. And just like real architecture
(namely good architecture) is often telling a story, also the ‘architecture’ in this
more virtual sense is about a ‘narrative’ of what digital technology does or will do
to contract law in the larger sense. The digital perspective is certainly a cross-
sectional perspective. This perspective will further enhance the view that there is
not just one rather one-dimensional image of contracts – namely as contracts for
exchange – but more than one,29 perhaps even many. Digital technology will
likely also further a less mechanical view of contracts – first formed or not formed,
then properly performed or breached – in favour of a more relational view of
contracting. ‘Relational contracts’ (or relational contracting) is understood in a
variety of ways. The common denominator would, however, seem to be that the
legal and doctrinal construction gives more easily way to the multitude of facets
of the relationship between the parties into which the legal treatment is em-
bedded. This, in our context, allows for the contractual relationship – for instance
27 See, for instance, Hacker, n 6 above; Ph. Hacker and B. Petkova, ‘Reining in the Big Promise
of Big Data. Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers’ Northwestern Journal of
Technology and Intellectual Property (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2773527.
28 From the abundant flow of literature on ‘private ordering’: G. Bachmann, Private Ordnung.
Grundlagen ziviler Regelsetzung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006); L. Bernstein, ‘Private Commer-
cial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions’ 99
Michigan Law Review 1724–1790 (2001) (still more pertinent in this respect than her more famous
piece on the diamond industry of 1992); G. Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism’, in Ch. Joerges,
I. J. Sand andG. Teubner (eds), Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance (Oxford et al: Hart
Publishing, 2004) 3–28.
29 Dorfleitner et al, n 18 above.
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created by a contract on digital content – to evolve over time (for instance, with
updates and new documentation), and thus also to change the ‘relational’ con-
tract from how it was initially formed.30 In this relational view, the issues of
constant reshaping of contracts (as an ongoing process) will play a larger role,
and, of course networks31 and platforms32 will be paramount, including the view
of contract as the basis of a (long-term) organisation.33
A particular challenge, for drafting as well as regulation, may lie in squaring
this realistically relational approach with smart contracts in which, as a general
rule, the terms and conditions of execution are fixed at the onset in code, allowing
for automatic enforcement irrespective of novel factual developments outside the
conditions specified in the original contract.34 However, while automatic enforce-
ment of clauses specified at the moment of the formation of the contract is the
paradigmatic case in smart contracts, different strategies exist to update and
30 The concept has famously been coined by S. Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Busi-
ness – a Preliminary Study’ 28 American Sociological Review 55–67 (1963); I. MacNeil, ‘The Many
Futures of Contract’ 47 Southern California Law Review 691–816 (1974); I. MacNeil, ‘Relational
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know’ Wisconsin Law Review 483–525 (1985); also V. P. Gold-
berg, ‘Relational Exchange: Economic and Complex Contracts’ 23 American Behavioural Scientist
337–352 (1980); see broader discussion, also on the later developments Grundmann (2017), n 2
above, chapter 17 (forthcoming).
31 G. Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (Oxford: Hart, 2011); S. Grundmann, ‘Contrac-
tual networks in German private law’, in F. Cafaggi (ed), Contractual Networks, Inter-Firm Coop-
eration and Economic Growth (Cheltenham et al: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) 111–162; based
mainly on the groundbreaking work by: W. W. Powell, ‘Neither Market nor Hierarchy – network
forms of organization’ 12 Research in Organizational Behaviour 295–336 (1990); Goldberg, n 30
above; more in particular with respect to networkswith a digital contractual basis, see, n 5 above:
Idelberger;Wright and de Filippi; Buterin.
32 On digital platforms, see, for instance: Research group on the Law of Digital Services, ‘Discus-
sion Draft of a Directive on Online Intermediary Platforms‘Journal of European Consumer and
Market Law (EuCML) 2016, 164–169; C. Busch et al, ‘The Rise of the Platform Economy: A New
Challenge for EU Consumer Law?’ Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (EuCML) 2016,
3–10; V. Mak, ‘Regulating Contract Platforms, the Case of Airbnb’, in Grundmann (ed), n 5 above,
(forthcoming); Estevan, n 18 above; for a US perspective, see, eg, V. Katz, ‘Regulating the Sharing
Economy’ 30 Berkeley Technical Law Journal 1067 (2015).
33 For the sweeping importance of this other image of contract see S. Grundmann, F. Cafaggi and
G. Vettori (eds), The Organisational Contract (Furnham et al: Ashgate, 2013) especially the intro-
duction; more in particular with respect to contractual organisation on a digital basis, see:
A. Norta, ‘Creation of Smart-Contracting Collaborations for Decentralized Autonomous Organiza-
tions’, in R. Matulevičius and M. Dumas (eds), Perspectives in Business Informatics Research
(Cham: Springer, 2015) 3–17; Wright and de Filippi, n 5 above; Buterin, n 5 above.
34 Cf H. Shadab, ‘What are Smart Contracts, and What Can We do with Them?’ (Coincenter,
15 December 2014), https://coincenter.org/entry/what-are-smart-contracts-and-what-can-we-do-
with-them, Section ‘How to Improve Smart Contracts’; Idelberger, n 5 above.
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partially rewrite smart contracts as well.35 For example, the contract may be
consensually terminated if the parties so wish, and the monetary value already
exchanged be restored to the original owner. Furthermore, the original smart
contract may include coding provisions that enable an updating later during the
contractual relationship. Even if such updating mechanisms were not embedded
initially into the smart contract, parts of it may be cancelled and rewritten after
formation. Hence, the contractual base, and even the code base, of smart con-
tracts may evolve over time as well.
Finally, digital contents shed a completely new light on the question of how
to shape and characterise the object of performance – what both parties owe,
namely also the user. Here again, the overall thrust may be summarized with the
statement that this object is also more fluid and its definition truly challenging,
from a contract theory perspective, but also very practically when it comes to
personal data36 – again with the exception of those smart contracts in which
performance is exactly pre-specified in code.
II Institutional Framework: Regulatory Issues,
Platforms, and Global Surroundings
1 The Core Components and Dimensions – Survey
The substantive discussion of an ‘architecture’ is probably best approached by
starting out from the institutional and regulatory framework. This is the first pillar
we describe. The regulatory environment for contracts in the digital world sepa-
rates into two distinct subfields. On the one hand, digital technology may be
actively harnessed by legislators and regulators in order to shape a proactive,
adaptive environment for contracts, both non-digital and, particularly, digitally
mediated ones. Such regulationwith algorithms may draw on the seminal work by
Lessig that spells out how societal and legal values may be infused directly into
code.37 Recently, regulation by technology has again been recognized as a promis-
35 We would like to thank Florian Idelberger for comments on these updating mechanisms; cf
also Buterin, n 23 above, 20–21.
36 See, for instance, Hacker and Petkova, n 27 above, particularly 17–24; H. Schweitzer et al,
‘Digitale Plattformen: Bausteine für einen künftigen Ordnungsrahmen‘, ZEW Discussion Paper
No 16-042 (2016), ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp16042.pdf, 21–23; H. Schweitzer, ‘Daten als
neueWährung‘ FAZ (24 February 2017) 18.
37 L. Lessig, Code version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
Digital Technology as a Challenge to European Contract Law 269
ing road forward for the establishment of a facilitative and effective framework for
governing the digital economy.38 For example, scholars have discussed the need
for, and the drawbacks of, regulators creating or improving digital intermediaries
that help consumers find the products best matching their preferences;39 others
have suggested that regulators ought to use Big Data and blockchain technology
to tailor contractual (and other) rules to individual addressees in ‘personalized
law’;40 and finally, that central banks should build centrally-banked cryptocurren-
cies as tools for monetary policy, potentially enabling novel types of financial
contracts andmeans of legal tender in the future.41
On the other hand, the digital component may reside not in the instrument,
but in the object of regulation: regulation of, not with digital technologies. This is
certainly the dimension of the institutional and regulatory framework on which
most ink has already been spilled, and which therefore forms the centre of our
overview. Concerning digital contracts, three aspects seem paramount: the first is
(i) the divide between individual contracts and platforms on which masses of
(typically highly standardised) contracts are prepared or formed – prepared by
indication of occasions, formed when such a mechanism is part of a platform
regime. Digital contracting thus is characterised by an extraordinarily intimate
link between the law of contracts and the law of markets.42 Equally important as a
framework parameter of digital contracting is (ii) the regulatory regime and
framework for both individual contracts and platforms as such. Finally, the
framework is immensely conditioned by (iii) the positioning of digital contracts or
of platforms for digital contracting – and their regulation – in a global environ-
ment.43 As questions of their application are foundational for the effect of such
regimes, this perspective would seem to be a natural starting point for a legal
analysis of contract law in the digital age. With these three institutions or institu-
38 G. Spindler, Regulierung durch Technik, Short Report (Berlin, 2016); Hacker, n 6 above, (forth-
coming).
39 Cf R. van Loo, ‘Rise of the Digital Regulator’ Duke Law Journal (forthcoming), https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2902238.
40 A. Porat and L. Strahilevitz, ‘Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data’ 112
Michigan Law Review 1417 (2014); O. Ben-Shahar and A. Porat, ‘Personalizing Negligence Law’ 91
New York University Law Review 627 (2016); Hacker (2017), n 6 above, 651.
41 D. Danezis and S. Meiklejohn, ‘Centrally banked cryptocurrencies’ Working Paper (2015),
arXiv preprint, arXiv:1505.06895.
42 The link would seem much more intimate than in the traditional analogue world, see
references above n 2–4.
43 On digital platforms, see, references above n 32; on digital contracting in a global environ-
ment, see, for instance, Svantesson, n 20 above; L.A. Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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tional divides, most of the architecture of contracting in the digital age would
seem to be captured: the relevant markets, encompassing also the mass transac-
tions; the relevant legal/regulatory regimes; and their application in a surround-
ing which is globalized to an extent largely unparalleled in other areas of
contracting.
We shall now take up these points in turn. The regulatory component is
inherent both in the discussion of the levels of regulation and in the difference
between platforms and contracts; these two dimensions of the institutional frame-
work for the digital world of contracts are thus scrutinized in greater detail in the
following two sections, always with a view to the interrelations between private
law and regulation.
2 National and Global – the Levels of Regulation
When it comes to the level of regulation, the starting point would seem to be that
many phenomena of digital platforms and contracting are more decidedly cross-
border than the regulation of these phenomena.44 A common perception (and
criticism) is therefore that phenomenon and regulation do not match, namely that
regulation is territorial and the phenomenon is global – with one core conse-
quence being that many laws may apply cumulatively.45 From this perspective, it
may even be doubtful whether the most important regulatory forces still take
sufficient effect in the digital arena – for instance law, code, market and norms
(as prominently identified by L. Lessig).46
While such concerns are well founded to some extent, and while certainly
more than just an adaptation of traditional regimes for the analogue world is
needed for a coherent regulatory regime for the digital arena,47 two structural
features should nevertheless not be overlooked. The first is about the level where
regulation typically takes place. At least in the EU – but in areas such as capital
44 See, for instance, Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM(2015) 192 final, 3–6; D. Svan-
tesson, ‘Time for the Law to Take Internet Geolocation Technologies Seriously’ 8 Journal of Private
International Law 473–487 (2012); Svantesson, n 20 above (observing as well that the digital arena
produces more contracting or at least more contracting with choice of law and choice of forum
clauses than analogue environments).
45 See, for instance, J. Goldsmith and T. Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) chapter 9; Svantesson, n 20 above (‘hyperregula-
tion’).
46 Bygrave, n 31 above, 4 et seq.
47 See, for instance, J. Kroll et al, ‘Accountable Algorithms’ University of Pennsylvania Law
Review (forthcoming), ssrn.com/abstract=2765268; Hacker, n 6 above.
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market law, competition law and banking regulation also in the US – regulation
tends to concentrate on the federal, i.e. the EU level, while national law (or state
law) is dominant for the private law regime – in contract law typically default
rules. Thus, public interest regulation as that part of the regime which is not open
to private law contracting – and boilerplate law which can indeed largely circu-
late across territories and thus create a legal platform transcending state terri-
tories –, is typically designed for such large entities as the entire European
internal market. Seen from this perspective, it may be less unforeseeable and
burdensome to adapt to such regimes, and the impact principle which reigns
supreme in business regulation48 may indeed justify an application of EU Law to
platforms and to contracts with EU clients (consumers). When indeed a contract
is formed, the ‘genuine link’ with the market where it is formed would seem to be
strong enough, and also the profit derived. Thus, while in tort law or with respect
to injunctions, the territoriality principle may lead to hyper-regulation by frag-
mentation, in contract law the risk seems less considerable. While there may be a
strong territoriality principle, it does not excessively fragment a world-wide
digital arena, at least not with respect to contract law and standards of conduct
relating to contracting.
The second feature which calls for some caution with respect to an allegedly
excessive fragmentation is the constitutionalization of private law and private
ordering. Indeed, most of the platforms are based on a legal regime combining
private law rules with some regulatory content. If such legal regimes set up by
private ordering constitute a significant part of a cross-border legal regime in the
digital arena of contracting, one other development may become increasingly
important, and discussion should focus on directing the endeavours into an
adequate direction. Constitutional principles more generally speaking have in-
deed increasingly been used namely with respect to rule setting by private bodies
(‘private ordering‘), which is ultimately based on party autonomy. Here, they
have been used to call for subjecting private ordering to rules such as proper
representation of all parties affected, transparency, accountability. This trend is
prominent namely in the conceptualization of large parts of transnational law,49
and should apply to digital private ordering as well.
48 The so-called effects doctrine (‘impact’ principle) – as opposed to the principle of territoriality
(seat of the actors or place of actions taken) –, was most prominently introduced in antitrust law:
see ECJ of 27 September 1988 – joined cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 through 129/85Woodpulp
[1988] ECR 5193. It is paramount, however, also in other areas such as capital market law or unfair
competition law.
49 For all these issues, both private ordering and in particular the transnational arena, see
references above n 28.
272 Stefan Grundmann and Philipp Hacker
3 Platform Markets and Individual Contracts
The second component of the institutional framework that merits special consid-
eration is platforms and the markets that they constitute. Regulation applies to
almost all of the aspects of the intersections between digitalization and contract
law. However, it seems particularly important with respect to platforms for four
reasons. First, platforms are already an area of intense regulatory scrutiny in
antitrust law.50 The economics literature on multi-sided platforms, and the speci-
fic market dynamics they engender,51 was applied to digital platforms in an
attempt to analyse how far dominant platforms could potentially hinder competi-
tion, abuse competitors and customers, and forestall innovation in the long run.52
An important literature has now developed on barriers to entry in the digital
economy,53 and platforms, precisely because they constitute the hubs, or gate-
ways, to many services in the digital economy, figure prominently in this litera-
ture. Ezrachi and Stucke, for example, argue that data-driven platforms may
apply personalized pricing schemes that not only approximate first-degree price
discrimination, but that also potentially exploit consumer biases.54 Such practices
would clearly not only trigger antitrust, but also contractual challenges as we
shall see below (Part III 1).
Second, platforms not only play a special role with respect to the mainte-
nance of an effective or workable competition, but they also are a crucial ingre-
dient for the environment in which digitally facilitated contracts all too often take
place. They provide the framework, as it were, that shapes the way in which
supply and demand are matched, in which products are perceived, and hence in
50 From the academic literature, see, eg, K. Devine, ‘Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided
Innovative Markets: How Do You Solve a Problem Like Google?’ 10 North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology 67 (2008); D. Evans, ‘The Web Economy, Two-Sided Markets, and Competition
Policy’ 2 Concurrences 57 (2010); for the investigations by the EU Commission into Google, see
Case COMP/C-3/39.740, Foundem/Google (30 November 2010); Case COMP/C-3/39.775, Ciao/
Google (30 November 2010); COMP/C-3/39.768, 1plusV/Google (30 November 2010).
51 J.-C. Rochet and J. Tirole, ‘Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ 1 Journal of the
European Economic Association 990 (2003); M. Armstrong, ‘Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ 37
The Rand Journal of Economics 668 (2006).
52 See, eg, I. Lianos and E. Motchenkova, ‘Market Dominance and Search Quality in the Search
EngineMarket’ 9 Journal of Comparative Law& Economics 419 (2013).
53 D. Rubinfeld andM. Gal, ‘Access Barriers to Big Data’Arizona Law Review (forthcoming), ssrn.
com/abstract=2830586.
54 Ezrachi and Stucke, n 9 above, Part III; A. Ezrachi and M. Stucke, ‘The rise of behavioural
discrimination’ (2016) 37 European Competition Law Review (ECLR) 485, 486–488; moreover, they
argue, algorithmic decision making may lead to novel forms of digitally-facilitated collusion that
is difficult to detect and prove, see id n 9 above, Part II.
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which a vast number of individual contracts are formed. The importance of
framing effects, underlined by behavioural economics,55 points to the specific
importance of this type of decision architecture that brings formerly diffused
agents together in specific channels that must be thoroughly analysed in order to
uphold basic principles of consumer or investor protection, fair and efficient
exchange, as well as innovation.
Third, platforms also more concretely shape the contractual relationships
and economic incentives for their users. Scholars have argued that liability of
platforms may follow from the reliance of users on the predominant influence of
the platform over the supplier.56 Going beyond the reliance criterion, we comple-
ment this proposal by suggesting that regulation may be necessary if contractual
‘predetermination’ by the platform leads to an unacceptable imbalance in the
allocation of risks between the platform users. When platforms supply default
contractual terms or provide for specific support for certain users, they act as de
facto ‘lawmakers’ for the platform environment: it would be rational for most
users to just accept this framework and not invest time and cognitive effort to
understand the terms and negotiate a better agreement with the counterparty, ie,
another user;57 and boundedly rational users would ignore the terms and condi-
tions most likely, anyway.58 This does not necessarily invite regulatory interven-
tion; however, if rational (and boundedly rational) apathy leads to the adoption
of a contractual framework supplied by a platform that engenders serious imbal-
ances in the allocation of risks and runs counter to the legitimate expectations of
users, regulatory solutions seem needed. For example, Airbnb at the moment only
supplies a ‘host guarantee’ that, to a certain extent, covers damage to the host’s
property caused by Airbnb guests.59 There is no corresponding ‘guest guarantee’
covering damage to guests caused by the host. This does create an imbalance in
the allocation of risks between hosts and guests; clearly, Airbnb wants to incenti-
vize hosts to offer recommendations on the platform, and believes that hosts are
more sensitive about damage to their property than guests are about being
55 A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’ 211
Science 453–458 (1981); A. Kühberger, ‘The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-
Analysis’ 75 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 23–55 (1998); overview in Ph.
Hacker,Verhaltensökonomik und Normativität (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017) § 4 B I 2.
56 Busch et al, n 32 above, 8–9; Research group on the Law of Digital Services, n 32 above, 167–
168, art 16(2)(b) and art 18.
57 Cf I. Ayres and A. Schwartz, ‘The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law’ 66 Stanford
Law Review 545, 546–548 (2014).
58 Cf O. Ben-Shahar and C. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2014) chapter 4; Hacker, n 55 above, § 9 D.
59 https://www.airbnb.com/guarantee.
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damaged themselves. However, this does not leave guests entirely without re-
course in case of damage; rather, guests may rely on the rental contract with the
hosts to seek damages from them. What is missing for guests is the additional
benefit of the guarantee by the platform. This, in turn, does not seem to contradict
legitimate expectations of users since such guarantees are not part of other rental
contracts, either; a real estate broker, for example, that brings a tenant and a
landlord together would never, under reasonable circumstances, offer such a
guarantee to the tenant.
However, imagine that Airbnb supplied a default rental agreement that users
may adopt which included a provision excluding host liability for damages to the
extent legally possible, for example excluding negligent damage to guests’ prop-
erty. This would not only create an imbalance in the allocation of risks, but might
also run counter to the legitimate expectations of guests. Here, a specific kind of
control of unfair contractual terms may be needed that takes account of the
multipolar relationship between users and platforms. As a result, platforms might
be required by future regulation to cover the risks, vis-à-vis their users, that they
inappropriately and unexpectedly shifted onto them. A crucial point, and diffi-
culty, of such a regulatory framework would be to determine what the legitimate
expectations of users are. On the one hand, a normative concept could be
employed that would have to take account of both boundedly and more fully
rational expectations of users.60 On the other hand, an empirical concept could be
used, governed by empirical surveys.61
Finally, fourth, there is the issue of innovation. As always in the regulation of
novel technologies, the safeguarding of innovation must not be understood as a
prohibition of regulation.62 Conversely, however, regulation could also be har-
nessed to specifically foster innovation, for example by providing safe legal
harbours for introducing novel, experimental features that, from an ex ante
perspective, do not pose grave risks for users, but that nevertheless introduce an
element of legal uncertainty, for example concerning liability. The ‘regulatory
sandbox’ introduced by the UK Financial Conduct Authority is a case in point:
60 Cf, for the related issue of consumer expectations, Ph. Hacker, ‘The Behavioral Divide. A
Critique of the Differential Implementation of Behavioral Law and Economics in the US and the
EU’ 11 European Review of Contract Law 299, 317–318 (2015).
61 Cf the recent proposal for interpreting contracts using empirical surveys by O. Ben-Shahar and
L. Strahilevitz, ‘Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and Experiments’, University of Chicago Coase-
Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No 791 (2017), https://ssrn.com/ab
stract=2905873.
62 R. Brownsword, ‘The shaping of our on-line worlds: getting the regulatory environment right’
20 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 249, 267 et seq (2012).
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businesses are thus able to test innovative products under modified or waived
rules, and have access to guidance by the regulatory agency.63 For instance, in the
present context, platforms may fear that if they offer not only mechanisms of
search and matchmaking, but also advice, they may be held liable if the advice
turns out to be inappropriate. Airbnb might introduce an automated piece of
advice that recommends specific apartments to potential guests based on the
user’s previous booking and rating history. On average, users may benefit from
such advice, particularly if novel techniques of automated advice (using, for
example, AI agents) are employed. At least in an introductory phase (eg, beta
versions), it is imaginable that regulation provides a safe harbour, shielding the
platform from liability in case some pieces of advice point into to the ‘wrong’
direction.
At the moment, the factual regulatory depth varies from platform to platform.
Crowdfunding is already subject to a deep thicket of securities regulation in the
EU. National legislatures have taken the first steps, and the EU legislature is about
to follow.64 Other platforms like Airbnb are currently operating in a regulatory
blind spot that leaves most of the decisions, and allocations of risk, to the plat-
forms and users.65 While some regulatory interventions from public law, particu-
larly addressing concerns about competition to hotels and the crowding out of
rental space for local inhabitants, have started to target Airbnb, a coherent
regulatory framework for the contractual interactions seems to be patently lack-
ing at the moment.
III The Use of Digital Technology over the Life
Cycle of a Contract – From Screening for Parties
to Enforcement and Interpretation
The regulatory framework analysed in the previous part shapes the second pillar
we have identified: the incentives and possibilities for the use of digital technol-
ogy at various stages of the life cycle of a contract. As we walk through these
different stages, it will become apparent that the intersections between digitiza-
tion and contracting draw on different technologies which, in turn, generate
different contractual possibilities and regulatory challenges.
63 See https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox.
64 See references in n 18 above.
65 Mak, n 32 above.
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1 Finding Contractual Partners
Digital technologies are increasingly used by individuals and companies to find,
screen and select potential contractual counterparties. These activities form an
important first stage in the life cycle of a contract. As we have seen, platforms
play a major role in this phase by providing services of matchmaking. For
example, eBay provides an effective tool of channelling buyers toward potential
sellers; Uber connects drivers and travellers; Airbnb links hosts and guests; and
crowdfunding platforms bring issuers and investors together.
However, we would like to note that the use of digital technologies in the
pre-contractual phase is not limited to platforms and the specific market dy-
namics they engender. Companies, including those other than platforms, are
increasingly relying on data mining and scoring techniques, enhanced by ma-
chine learning, to identify targets for marketing and contracting.66 As is well-
known, personal data about potential addressees of marketing material or
contractual offers is collected to this end by a variety of companies and advertis-
ing networks.67 In this way, personal data is converted into a valuable commer-
cial product, which pays for many of the ‘free’ services most consumers nowa-
days take for granted in the digital world.68 The disclosure of data between data-
collecting companies, such as digital platforms, data brokers or advertising net-
works, not only raises data protection concerns;69 it also creates novel informa-
tional asymmetries between those companies having access to the relevant data
and algorithms, and the data subjects who, in most cases, do not.70 As a growing
literature in theoretical and empirical economics shows, this leads to the possi-
66 See I. Witten et al, Data Mining: Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques (4th ed,
Amsterdam: Morgan Kaufman, 2016) 26–27; F. Pasquale, The Black Box Society (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2016) chapter 2; V. Mayer-Schönberger and K. Cukier, Big Data (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013) chapter 6; A. Gandomi and M. Haider, ‘Beyond the hype: Big
data concepts, methods, and analytics’ 35 International Journal of Information Management 137
(2015); for a particularly critical perspective, see, eg, C. O’Neil,Weapons of Math Destruction (New
York: Crown, 2016).
67 See, eg, F. Borgesius, Improving privacy protection in the area of behavioural targeting
(PhD thesis, 2014), http://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=c74bdba6-616c-4cd9-925e-33a5858935e5,
chapter 2.
68 C. Hoofnagle and J. Whittington, ‘Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular
Price’ 61 University of California Los Angeles Law Review 606 (2014); Hacker and Petkova, n 27
above, 17–24.
69 Borgesius, n 67 above, 82 et seq; O. Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 196 et seq.
70 Calo, n 6 above, 1002–1012; 1015–1018; Mik, n 6 above, 12 et seq.
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bility of so-called exploitative contracting.71 In this, contractual offers are tai-
lored, by data-savvy companies, to the behavioural vulnerabilities of current or
future clients.72 For example, consumers with significant present bias may be
served offers for teaser rates that, for these consumers, have negative expected
value. This raises the question of the enforcement of the principle of fairness at
the pre-contractual stage, where on the one hand innovative contracting mini-
mizing search costs should be facilitated, but exploitative schemes mitigated. An
important avenue of future research will be to inquire how notions of fairness
can be squared with automated screening procedures enhanced by artificial
intelligence.73 This is particularly relevant to European Contract Law where, in
contrast to US contract law, notions of fair bargaining during the pre-contractual
process are recognized.74
Furthermore, discrimination is a crucial concern when automated algorith-
mic decisions are employed to screen potential contractual parties.75 For example,
data mining and machine learning techniques are increasingly used to select job
applicants.76 As a number of articles have shown, however, bias may enter these
algorithmic processes at various instances of the design and application of the
algorithm – particularly in the case of self-learning algorithms.77 This is a real
concern when, for instance, the data of historically successful candidates consti-
tute the training data in machine learning; if, for historical reasons, these candi-
dates were mostly white males, the algorithm will likely find white and male
71 B. Kőszegi, ‘Behavioral Contract Theory’ 52 Journal of Economic Literature 1075, 1104–1110
(2014); P. Heidhues et al, ‘Exploitative Innovation’ 8 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
1 (2016).
72 See again Calo, n 6 above.
73 See, eg, C. Dwork et al, ‘Fairness Through Awareness’ Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in
Theoretical Computer Science Conference 214 (2012); R. Zemel et al, ‘Learning Fair Representations’
28 Proceeding of the 30th International Conference onMachine Learning 325 (2013).
74 See, for the European perspective, Study Group on a European Civil Code / Research Group on
EC Private Law (Acquis Group), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law,
Outline Edition (Munich: Sellier, 2009) Principles 7, 8 and 10, 65–68; for the US perspective,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt c (Philadelphia: ALI, 1981); § 1–304 UCC (both
restricting the obligations of good faith to the performance and enforcement of a contract).
75 S. Barocas and A. Selbst, ‘Big Data’s Disparate Impact’ 104 California Law Review 672 (2016);
Hacker and Petkova, n 27 above.
76 P. Kim, ‘Data-Driven Discrimination at Work’William & Mary Law Review (forthcoming), http
s://ssrn.com/abstract=2801251.
77 See, eg, T. Calders and I. Žliobaitė, ‘Why Unbiased Computational Processes Can Lead to
Discriminative Decision Procedure’s, in B. Custers et al (eds), Discrimination and Privacy in the
Information Society (Berlin: Springer, 2013) 43.
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applicants more attractive.78 It remains doubtful in how far antidiscrimination
law can tackle this problem.79 Procedures of algorithmic fairness may offer a way
forward here, a topic increasingly explored in the computer science literature80
that only starts to make an impact on legal analysis.81
However, companies are not the only players using digital technology in the
pre-contractual phase; increasingly, individual clients and consumers also use
technical support to find contractual offers that fit their preferences, or to certify
that they belong to a particular, advantageous group of consumers.82 A key chal-
lenge for regulation in the digital economy is for regulators to bring about, or at
least facilitate, the effective, efficient and fair functioning of such digital intermedi-
aries.83
2 Drafting
The art of drafting a contract on the one hand consists in finding the right
contractual clauses that fit the situational pattern. Increasingly, the identifica-
tion of such clauses, and of relevant factual documents to support and comple-
ment a contract, can be delegated to AI agents.84 For example, given certain
parameters as to the factual environment of the contract (goods sold; quanti-
ties; time and place of performance; concrete counterparty), they could find
clauses that are least likely to be litigated over, or that are least likely to trigger
a longer negotiation process. Traditionally, lawyers would have consulted
handbooks written by practitioners which condense the experience of many
authors into practical, step-by-step drafting instructions. With the right set of
training data, this experience can be ‘learned’ by an AI agent, and applied with
greater speed to a given contractual situation than any human lawyer could
78 Cf S. Lowry and G. MacPherson, ‘A Blot on the Profession’ 296 British Medical Journal 657–658
(1988).
79 See the references in n 75 et seq above.
80 See references in n 73 above.
81 Kroll et al, n 47 above.
82 M. Gal and N. Elkin-Koren, ‘Algorithmic Consumers’ Harvard Journal of Law and Technology
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2876201.
83 van Loo, n 39 above; O. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)
5.
84 J. McGinnis and R. Pearce, ‘The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform
the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services’ 82 Fordham Law Review 3041, 3050–3052
(2014); H. Surden, ‘Machine Learning and Law’ 89Washington Law Review 87, 110–114 (2014).
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deliver.85 It seems plausible that in AI agent could at least provide a decent first
draft of a given contract, similarly to the one now produced by the legal
associate and submitted to a partner for review. The advent of technology in
the drafting sphere seems to harbinger a greater potential of personalizing
contracts and adapting them to the specific circumstances of the environment;
technology may thus fill some, but certainly not all, gaps in incomplete con-
tracts by decreasing the costs of fitting contractual terms to specific parameters,
and by providing estimates of the likely evolution of the contractual relation-
ship.86 Such applications of AI facilitated contractual drafting is different from
the AI applications discussed in the previous section that gave rise to the
problems of exploitation or discrimination: in drafting, while it cannot be
excluded that issues of exploitation or discrimination may arise there as well,
the focus is on the adaptation of contractual clauses to given environments.
Hence, if negative externalities are a smaller problem in this context, the need
for regulation would also be diminished, and the resulting legal relationships
would seem to be governed to a greater extent by classical private law.
However, not only can the selection of clauses draw on digital technology;
with smart contracts even the very obligations of the parties themselves can be
expressed in code.87 They can be written into a blockchain (particularly: the
Ethereum blockchain) in order to make obligations clear, verifiable, and (par-
tially) automatically executable. Smart contracts build on an early contribution
by Nick Szabo88 and are a variety of what Harry Surden later called ‘computable
contracts’, ie, contracts in which obligations or conditions are specified as com-
85 G. Sartor, ‘Contracts in the Infosphere’, in Grundmann (ed), n 5 above, (forthcoming); for
limitations, cf also Surden, n 84 above, 105–107; D. Katz, ‘Quantitative Legal Prediction – or –
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data Driven Future of the Legal
Services Industry’ 62 Emory Law Journal 909, 958 et seq (2013).
86 On contractual gaps, see I. Ayres and R. Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules’ 99 Yale Law Journal 87–130 (1989).
87 On smart contracts, see, e.g., Idelberger, n 5 above; R. Weber, ‘Contractual Duties and Alloca-
tion of Liability in Automated Digital Contracts’, in Schulze and Staudenmayer, n 6 above, 163–
187; G. Peters and E. Panayi, ‘Understanding Modern Banking Ledgers through Blockchain Tech-
nologies: Future of Transaction Processing and Smart Contracts on the Internet of Money’, in
P. Tasca et al (eds), Banking Beyond Banks and Money (Switzerland: Springer International
Publishing, 2016) 239–278; Wright and de Filippi, n 5 above, 10–12 and 24–26; Ch. Lim et al,
‘Smart Contracts: Bridging the Gap Between Expectation and Reality’, Oxford Business Law Blog
(11 July 2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2016/07/smart-contracts-brid
ging-gap-between-expectation-and-reality; Buterin, n 23 above.
88 N. Szabo, ‘Formalizing and securing relationships on public networks’ 2 (9) First Monday
(1997) http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469.
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puter data and which were pioneered, particularly, in the financial sector.89 Their
implementation in code triggers a whole set of questions concerning, for example,
the effect of the illegality of certain obligations on the nature of their automated
execution, or the limited congruence between ‘contracts’ in a blockchain and
‘contracts’ in a legal sense. As was noted above, smart contracts may be rewritten
to a certain extent if the parties so agree.90 However, neither of the parties may
unilaterally invalidate any of the contractual provisions even if they clearly
violate the law. This poses a problem insofar as the self-executing character of the
provisions means that the provision will be enforced nevertheless.91 Hence, we
suppose that the drafting stage in smart contracts assumes an importance that is
possibly even greater than under ‘dumb’ contracts: parties must be aware of the
fact that they cannot unilaterally withhold performance once it has been written
into a smart contract. Whether nullity or substantive control of standard terms are
instruments which will still be developed in this context is an open question. We
shall come back to some of these issues in the subsection addressing performance
(below, III 4). What remains clear, at this point already, is that the blockchain
environment links the different stages of a contractual life cycle together in a
closer way than is the case with traditional contracts.
3 Formation
At the formation stage, three types of digital mediation may be distinguished that
run from more mainstream and established digital technology all the way to
cutting-edge innovations of artificial intelligence. The first type comprises con-
tracts formed using declarations of will that are exchanged electronically, for
example by email. Since the year 2000, these practices have been governed at the
European level by the E-Commerce Directive (ECD, above note 8) that, impor-
tantly, contained specific information duties meant to ensure that both parties are
fully informed about the identity of the counterparty, the main parameters of the
object of the contract, particularly the price (Article 5 et seq ECD), and the most
important steps of contract formation and content (Article 10 ECD). Furthermore,
the ECD ensured that national contract law allowed for the formation of valid
contracts by electronic means (Article 9(1) ECD), thus treating online and offline
contracts essentially similarly with respect to most legal requirements and con-
89 H. Surden, ‘Computable Contracts’, 46UCDavis Law Review 629, 634 et seq (2012).
90 N 35 above and accompanying text.
91 Wright and de Filippi, n 5 above, 25–26.
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sequences (other than the ones just discussed). As Roger Brownsword argues, the
key aim of this provision, and a key aim of the ECD in general, was to provide
certainty about the legal validity of online transactions in an early age of online
contracting.92 However, with the advent of the new world of profiling, scoring and
personalization (above, II 1), he argues, another regime for contractual formation
might be needed that clearly differentiates between the diverging challenges of
offline and online contracts. To some extent, if we accept this point, it is unclear
whether such a regime would best be developed at a national or a European level,
or (probably) on both; nevertheless, the novel asymmetries of information and
power that digital technologies give rise to have already provoked a host of
regulatory ideas to re-establish a balance of interest, and the possibilities of
informed decisions, at the stage of the formation of contract.93 Whether this will
eventually lead to an entirely separate formation, and general legal, environment
for digital contracts awaits further scrutiny.94
The second type of digitally mediated contractual formation is reached where
not only declarations of will are exchanged electronically, but where their ex-
change, and the market, is additionally structured by a digital platform that
facilitates the matching of contractual parties; beyond matchmaking, the plat-
form may also serve as a device for the formation and storage of the terms of the
contract (above, II 3). While facilitating the formation of contracts, platforms also
gather a number of personal data from their users, contributing to the scoring
process described for the pre-contractual stage (above, III 1). Again, different
stages of contracting merge.
92 Brownsword, n 10 above.
93 See, eg, Sachverständigenrat für Verbraucherfragen, Verbraucherrecht 2.0 – Verbraucher in
der digitalen Welt, Report (Berlin, 2016) 19–24 and 46–48; Hacker and Petkova, n 27 above,
discussing, inter alia, mandatory data-free services, to be chosen in an active choice regime at the
moment of contract formation, the control of contractual terms concerning privacy via the
unconscionability / unfair contractual terms doctrine, and democratization of data collection;
Calo, n 6 above, 1047, suggesting a paid-option regime; Hoofnagle and Whittington, n 68 above,
657 et seq, promoting, inter alia, mandatory price setting for ‘free’ offers.
94 The Commission seems to be taking preliminary steps towards such a separate regime in the
proposed Directive on Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, which cuts across contractual
typologies and differentiates, instead, between contracts with, and without, digital content (see
below, IV); however, the proposal does not include novel provisions governing the formation of
contracts; similarly, rules on contractual formation are absent from the proposed Directive on
Online and other Distant Sales of Goods.
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The third type of digitally mediated contract formation is reached with the
advent of artificial intelligence.95 The acceptance of an offer, or even the formula-
tion of a counter-offer, may be delegated to AI agents who, acting with different
degrees of autonomy, conclude the contract on behalf of their principal.96 While
platforms, therefore, facilitate the formation of the contract, AI agents may take
the very steps of contract formation themselves. Obviously, both technologies
(platforms and AI agents) may come together, particularly as machine-to-ma-
chine communication becomes more important with the spread of the Internet of
Things.97 If intelligent, personal digital assistants take over many of the more, and
increasingly perhaps even less, mundane tasks of ordering goods and services for
consumption, the real challenge for contract law at the formation state will likely
not involve the ‘automated consumption’,98 and contracts, between these agents,
but the original, ‘contractual’ acts of delegation between humans and their digital
assistants. Here, we believe that concepts developed in the tradition of commer-
cial and company law may prove fruitful that deal with the adequate empower-
ment and monitoring of agents in small companies, as consumers increasingly
approximate principals that delegate authority and discretion to their digital
agents/assistants –with the necessary adaptation of these rules from the business
to the consumer world. For example, we can imagine to differentiate between
types of authority of different reach (from the fully authorized signatory (Prokur-
ist) to the simple shop(ping) assistant99) that are standardized as consumers
choose from a menu of digital assistants they would like to ‘hire’. To facilitate this
choice, the different types of authority different digital assistants imply could be
marked, in a ‘traffic light system’, with different colours, spanning from green (for
limited authority) to red (extensive authority). The automated transactions be-
tween digital assistants themselves might become less relevant for contract law as
the focus will be on their factual implementation and execution. Meanwhile, more
explicitly regulatory approaches will then be needed, where necessary, to shape
the design of and the interactions between the digital assistants themselves to
ensure that the very asymmetries of information and power that shape relation-
ships between humans, and that are subject to legal review and regulation, are
95 For a primer on AI, see, eg, S. Russell and P. Norvig,Artificial Intelligence: AModern Approach
(3rd ed, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2010) chapter 1; for applications, see Witten et al, n 66
above, chapter 1; McKinsey Global Institute, The Age of Analytics, Report (London, 2016) 81–93.
96 Sartor, n 85 above.
97 Cf Surden, n 89 above, 694 et seq; M. Weyrich et al, ‘Machine-to-Machine Communication’ 31
(4) IEEE Software 19–23 (2014).
98 Brownsword, n 10 above.
99 Cf §§ 48–58 German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch –HGB).
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not re-created between digital assistants of various stages of development and
capacities. A related challenge is presented by predatory and exclusionary con-
duct, or contracts, undertaken by digital assistants, to be answered by future
antitrust law.100
In all of these novel methods of drafting and formation, the use of adaptive,
intelligent systems seems to us to harbour the possibility of making contracts
more amenable to the continuous adaptation of the terms of the contract to novel
developments. If both parties so wish, they could agree on an adaptation of, for
example, the coded provisions of a smart contract to reflect a change in the
present state of the world, or in the estimation of the likelihood of future events. It
does not even seem far-fetched to imagine that both parties to a contract could
use AI agents, as legal agents, and delegate to them the task of agreeing on
mutually beneficial contractual updates as new information (for example, on a
shift of supply or demand in the market concerning a good that is object to a sales
contract) becomes available.101 This would certainly strengthen, as noted before,
the relational character of the contract.
4 Performance
Importantly, even the performance of a contract may, partially or entirely, be
delegated to digital technology. In computable or smart contracts, this goes
beyond the mere payment with electronic payment systems. Rather, the fulfilment
of any number of conditions upon which the performance is contingent may be
electronically verified; upon verification, automated performance mechanisms
may be initiated. Again, blockchain technology is particularly suitable for these
tasks as it provides a consensus mechanism for the verification of certain condi-
tions, for example the payment of specified amounts of cryptocurrency, such as
Bitcoins, to the designated recipient. Similarly, the transfer of other assets may be
recorded on electronic ledgers using blockchain technology. A central problem of
this approach remains the verification of events that happen ‘off chain’; Ether-
eum, for example, has introduced so-called ‘oracles’ that could monitor and
verify external events that trigger contractual consequences, similar to a panel of
arbiters.102
100 Gal and Elkin-Koren, n 82 above, 38–47.
101 Cf also Idelberger, n 5 above, section 4 1.
102 V. Buterin, ‘Ethereum and Oracles’, Ethereum Blog (22 July 2014), https://blog.ethereum.
org/2014/07/22/ethereum-and-oracles/; see alsoWeber, n 87 above, 166–167.
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As is well-known, probably the most important technological contribution of
blockchain is the solution of the problem of the trusted third-party.103 Blockchains
operate in a way not requiring reliance on personalized trust because of the
distributed consensus mechanism that ties the verification of each additional
block to a majority vote of the nodes running the chain. Hence, there is no central
party that needs to be trusted to verify and guarantee the authenticity of the
information contained in the blockchain. Similarly, smart contracts offer a way of
mitigating the problem of trust concerning the willingness of the party to perform
the contract. Since performance is enforced automatically once the conditions
specified in the contract are met, there is no way for the bound party to unilat-
erally withhold performance.104 The need for verification of off chain events does
reintroduce a certain amount of necessary trust (in oracles, for example); but to
the extent that verification by multiple independent nodes (oracles), rather than
by the (conflicted) counterparty of a contract, is perceived as more objective, the
required level of trust is still lower than in a traditional contract.105 Additionally,
as the transfer of more and more movable and immovable objects (such as
securities; real estate; cars) is executed on blockchains, both performance and
counter-performance can be verified on the chain, making trusted oracles obso-
lete for these purposes.106 To be sure, automated enforcement potentially creates
other problems in contract law, for example when the party would have a right to
withhold performance even though the conditions specified in the original con-
tract are met. Nevertheless, automated performance and enforcement generally
lower the level of trust needed between the parties,107 and hence make coopera-
tion, and mutually beneficial contracts, more likely to occur.
103 Nakamoto, n 21 above, 2.
104 Lim et al, n 87 above.
105 Cf J. Weldon, ‘Building an “Oracle” for an Ethereum Contract’Medium (11 October 2016), htt
ps://medium.com/@mustwin/building-an-oracle-for-an-ethereum-contract-6096d3e39551#.f335
uyw5a; B. Arruñada, ‘Blockchain’s Struggle to Deliver Impersonal Exchange’, Pompeu Fabra
University Economics and Business Working Paper Series 1549 (2017), https://ssrn.com/ab
stract=2903857, 31.
106 See M. Iansiti and K. Lakhani, ‘The Truth About Blockchain’ Harvard Business Review
(January-February 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain, for the growing
potential of transferring ownership via blockchains.
107 Cf A. Kosba et al, ‘Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving
Smart Contracts’ Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) (San José:
IEEE, 2016) 839; but see also Arruñada, n 105 above.
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5 Linking Contracts
Different contracts may be linked into contractual networks using a system of
smart contracts. One particular, and particularly noteworthy, instantiation of
such smart contractual networks are decentralized autonomous organizations
(DAOs), ie, systems written in code that function with a large degree of indepen-
dence from human intervention and that are endowed with some internal capital
they allocate to certain functions.108 They may be used, for example, as invest-
ment vehicles that automatically collect contributions by investors, invest the
collected funds, and distribute the returns according to a pre-specified algorithm.
The investment decisions can be subjected, to different degrees, to the votes of
investors; this promises to minimize monitoring costs for (the non-existent) hu-
man managers while, at the same time, allowing for shareholder voting to remain
meaningful.
However, as the spectacular hack of the best-known DAO in June 2016
showed,109 such contractual networks not only give rise to questions of the
application of securities regulation, investor protection or company law, but also
and prominently of the (cyber)security of invested funds. The complexity of such
linked contracts therefore not only allows to offer novel forms of investment
packages, and contractual networks or network contracts, but also highlights
the risks of cyber security that increase with the number of attack points a
complex system offers.110 Given that many commentators see the core advan-
tages of the organizational contract (long-term and typically arranged in net-
works) in its informality and in the role an open system of reciprocity plays,111 a
word of caution would seem to be required before one derives lessons from
arrangements in digital networks (typically highly formalized) to those in the
analogue world.
108 Buterin, n 5 above.
109 J. Wong and I. Klar, ‘Everything you need to know about the Ethereum “hard fork”’ Quartz
(18 July 2016), http://qz.com/730004/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-ethereum-hard-fo
rk/.
110 Cf B. Schneier, ‘Click Here to Kill Everyone’ New York Magazine (27 January 2017), nymag.co
m/selectall/2017/01/the-internet-of-things-dangerous-future-bruce-schneier.html.
111 See references above n 31 and O. Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations’ 22 Journal of Law & Economics 233–261 (1979); O. Williamson, The
Economic Institutions of Capitalism – Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (New York / London:
MacMillan, 1985) esp chapter 2.
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6 Interpretation
A final issue that will likely arise as digitally mediated contracts become more
popular is the question of interpretation. There seems to be a patent lack of
literature on this issue, and we shall restrict our observations in this overview to
pointing out three specific problems and avenues for future research. First, some
debate exists already on whether special rules of interpretation should govern
contracts concluded by (mainstream) electronic means;112 this problem is exacer-
bated when parties simply assent to contractual terms supplied by platforms, and
do not exchange declarations of will in the traditional sense; or when AI agents
‘exchange’ offer and acceptance. Second, interpretation presents a particularly
thorny issue with smart contracts written entirely in code. It remains to be seen
how courts will grapple with the difficulty of ‘interpreting’ a programming lan-
guage that, in many respects, differs from a natural language.113 Third, AI technol-
ogy may be used to estimate the outcome of legal disputes, be they over smart or
traditional contracts.114 With increasing granularity of the prediction of the court
interpretation of clauses, the results of this prospective interpretation can be fed
back into the drafting stage of the contract. Hence, it becomes clear that, with the
digitalization of contracting, the life cycle of a contract quite literally, in many
aspects, becomes a real cycle in which beginning, end and other stages tend to
overlap and mutually influence one another.
IV Digital Objects of Contract – CESL II and More
We finally turn to the last pillar of the architecture we are describing: digital
objects of contract. From a bird’s eye perspective, the following contracts with
112 See, eg, C. Gillette, ‘Interpretation and Standardization in Electronic Sales Contracts’ 53 SMU
Law Review 1431 (2000); F. Schuster, in G. Spindler and F. Schuster, Recht der elektronischen
Medien (3rd ed, Munich: Beck, 2015) § 305 c BGB, para 14.
113 See S. Grundmann and Ph. Hacker, ‘The Digital Dimension as a Challenge to European
Contract Law – the Architecture’, in Grundmann (ed), n 5 above, (forthcoming), under III 6; cf also
C. Prisacariu and G. Schneider, ‘A formal language for electronic contracts’, in M. Bonsangue and
E. Johnsen, International Conference on Formal Methods for Open Object-Based Distributed Sys-
tems (Berlin: Springer, 2007) 174.
114 D. Katz et al, ‘A General Approach for Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Working Paper (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2463244; T. Ruger et al, ‘The
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme
Court Decision-Making’ 104 Columbia Law Review 1150 (2004); overview in: Katz, n 85 above, 936
et seq.
Digital Technology as a Challenge to European Contract Law 287
digital content may be distinguished: first, the digital component may reside in
the performance or in the counter-performance of a contract. The performance
may, on the one hand, be related to personal or, on the other hand, to non-
personal data. In the former instance, European data protection law, parts of
which may be viewed as a specific regulatory framework for contracts concerning
the processing of personal data, governs the legal relationships.115 For example,
when personal data is sold or rented to third parties by data brokers, the main
questions of data protection law are now treated in the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). However, the object of performance may also be related to
non-personal data. For example, contracts govern the download of e-books or the
provision of certain digital services on the manifold platforms that constitute the
backbone of the digital economy.116
It has become a common understanding, however, that digital content need
not only be the object of the contractual performance, but may also constitute the
counter-performance. Non-monetary forms of ‘payment’ have become particu-
larly important whenever digital services are provided free of monetary charge.117
The data transferred is almost always personal data of the users. On the one hand,
this data enables the provision of targeted, personalized advertisement to these
very users (above, III 1), for which providers of multi-sided platforms are able to
charge higher prices to advertisers than for non-targeted advertisements.118 On the
other hand, the analysis of the personal data provided helps the platforms, and
other companies, to continuously improve their analytic and predictive models,
which may then be applied to other users, thus contributing to the very essence of
the algorithmic prowess that makes these companies so economically valuable
today.119
Hence, we want to note that whenever personal data constitutes the counter-
performance, it becomes questionable what the characteristic performance of the
contract is.120 Traditionally, in the provision of goods or services in exchange for
115 See art 2, Reg 2016/679 [General Data Protection Regulation]; for an overview of European
data protection law, see Lynskey, n 69 above.
116 See, eg, Sachverständigenrat für Verbraucherfragen, n 93 above, 48; A. Metzger, ‘Dienste
gegen Daten: Ein synallagmatischer Vertrag’ 216Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 817 (2016).
117 See references, n 68 above.
118 Hacker and Petkova, n 27 above, 17–24.
119 Cf E. Siegel, Predictive analytics: The power to predict who will click, buy, lie, or die (Hoboken:
Wiley, 2013); Gandomi and Haider, n 66 above, 143; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, n 66 above,
chapters 2 and 6; Witten et al, n 66 above, 28–30; H. Chen et al, ‘Business intelligence and
analytics: From big data to big impact’, 36MIS quarterly 1165–1188 (2012).
120 Cf Rec 19 Reg 593/2008 [Rome I].
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money, the monetary component is regarded as uncharacteristic.121 However,
since personal data is the very fuel that keeps the engine of the data-driven
business models running, and is put to multiple kinds of analytic and predictive
uses that money is not, one might be tempted to conclude that, in many cases, it
becomes as, or even more, characteristic as the service for which it is exchanged.
This holds particularly true when the service is quite trivial in nature, such as a
simple flashlight app for a smart phone. This may have repercussions (i) within
private international law as the characteristic performance determines, if no
contractual type can be easily identified, how a contract is qualified and the law
of what country is applicable to it;122 and (ii) for the default legal regime applying
to a contract that, often, will also follow the characteristic performance, particu-
larly insofar as this regime is not fully contained in the proposed Directive on
certain aspects concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content (CSDC,
above n. 11), to which we now turn.
Intended as a continuation of the Common European Sales Law (CESL) with
other means, and with a different scope,123 the two proposed directives on con-
tracts for the supply of digital content and for online sales assimilate the frame-
work of obligations and remedies from the Directive on the Sale of Consumer
Goods124 to digital contracts.125 However, in sticking to (a narrowed version of) the
CESL frame of specifying general rules of contractual conformity and remedies,
the directives fail to address some of the biggest challenges that digital contract-
ing poses and that were described in the previous section (second pillar). For
example, the phenomenon of data as a novel currency is clearly recognized and
covered by Article 3(1) CSDC. Nevertheless, none of the crucial questions follow-
ing from this observation are addressed, such as: (i) What is the value of data,126
and may this lead to serious imbalances in the contractual obligations? (ii) How
far is data processing enabled by the exchange of data for services and goods
excessive, and how can the law mitigate exploitative schemes (above, III 1)? (iii)
How can issues of discrimination that arise in the pre-contractual phase be
121 D. Martiny, inMünchener Kommentar, Rom I-VO (6th ed, Munich: Beck, 2015) Art 4, para 172.
122 Art 4(2) Rome I.
123 This is not the place to retell the story of CESL and its predecessors; for references, see, n 14
above; for the connection of CESL to the digital era, see, eg, R. Schulze, ‘The New Shape of
European Contract Law’ Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (EuCML) 2015, 139–144;
for the different scope of CESL and the proposed directives, see, eg, Spindler, n 15 above, sub II
and III.
124 Dir 1999/44/EC.
125 For differences, see, eg, Smits, n 13 above.
126 See, eg, Hacker and Petkova, n 27 above, 17–24; A. Acquisti et al, ‘What Is PrivacyWorth?’ 42
Journal of Legal Studies 249–274 (2013).
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addressed (above, III 1)? It seems that the Commission, with its focus on spurring
economic growth through the digital economy,127 and by restricting its regulatory
ambitions to a set of obligations and remedies mostly taken from CELS, is missing
some of the important, novel dynamics that digital contracting has engendered.
Another key difficulty in the legal framework governing contracts with digital
content will be the reconciliation of the CSDC with the novel EU data protection
law that applies whenever personal data are processed. There are a number of
palpable contradictions between the GDPR and the CSDC;128 the most notable
probably is the right to withdraw consent to the processing of personal data
according to Article 7(3) GDPR, which seems to conflict with the enforceable duty
to provide accurate personal information once personal data is perceived as the
counter-performance in a contract exchanging economically valuable goods –
which is precisely the perspective of the CSDC. One potential regulatory option
would be to distinguish between contracts with monetary compensation (fully
enforceable) and those – much more informal ones – where an online ‘service’ is
rendered accessible to those who give their personal data ‘in compensation’, and
deal with these situations without making recourse to the concept of a ‘binding’
contract at all (no will of being bound). As regards the law as proposed in the two
regulations, it remains an open question whether Article 7(3) GDPR would man-
date a right of rescission for contracts where personal data constitutes the coun-
ter-performance, and what the consequences of the use of this right would be for
the contractual relationship. Article 13(2)(b) CSDC holds that, upon termination,
‘the supplier shall [...] refrain from the use of the counter-performance other than
money which the consumer has provided in exchange for the digital content and
any other data collected [...]’; this seems consonant with Article 7(3) GDPR which
provides that ‘[t]he withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of
processing based on consent before its withdrawal’. This should, however, not
contradict any improvement already made prior to termination that can still be
used after termination without any impact on the personal data. The most
important example might be the incrementally improved performance of the
predictive model which will continue to accrue to the provider even after the
contract is terminated or consent withdrawn.129
Another troubling divergence between GDPR and CSDC lies in the extent to
which users may use personal data as a means of counter-performance.130 Arti-
cle 3(1) CSDC treats monetary and non-monetary forms of counter-performance
127 Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM(2015) 192 final, 3.
128 Cf Spindler, n 15 above;Metzger, n 116 above, 825–826.
129 Cf Staudenmayer, n 13 above, 819–820.
130 CfMetzger, n 116 above, 824; Schweitzer, n 36 above.
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identically; hence, one may suppose, payment with data is not subjected to any
substantial limits, similar to the payment with money (except provisions in
general contract law governing the adequate balance of performance and coun-
ter-performance – which again are difficult to apply when personal data with
uncertain value is at stake). The novel Article 7(4) GDPR, however, stipulates that
for the assessment of freedom, and hence validity, of consent to process personal
data, ‘utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a
contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the
processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that
contract’. The provision is meant to push back against the ever-increasing de-
mand for more personal data on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by providers of digital
content, and to limit the amount and type of personal data that can be ‘used’ as a
medium of exchange (cf Recitals 42–43 GDPR): to the extent that data is not
necessary for the performance of the contract, one may not, under the conditions
of Article 7(4) GDPR, use it as counter-performance. To be sure, it remains highly
doubtful what data exactly are necessary for the performance of a contract – as
we have seen, it is increasingly difficult to attach a single, characteristic purpose
to a contract in which data is exchanged against goods or services. Rather,
economically speaking, the purpose of the contract precisely lies in this very
exchange.131 The interpretation of Article 7(4) GDPR by the CJEU therefore is
difficult to forecast. Meanwhile, Article 3(7) CSDC specifies that other Union acts
take precedence over the CSDC, and Article 3(8) CSDC reiterates this for EU data
protection law; hence, Article 7(4) GDPR will eventually define in how far data
may be used as remuneration. However, to the extent that Article 3(1) CSDC wants
to subject precisely the very contracts that the GDPR governs to the CSDC regime
of obligations and remedies, it would be premature to brush the differences
between the two legislative acts aside by reference to the subsidiary character of
the CSDC – otherwise, some of its most novel provisions would be hollowed out
before even taking effect, and without a discussion of normative issues at all.
Those are only some of the problems that plague the CSDC. The future of
digital contracting, and the future of the academic discussion, will tell whether it
will fulfil its promise to facilitate cross-border trade and contracting.
131 Cf A. Acquisti et al, ‘The Economics of Privacy’ 54 Journal of Economic Literature 442, 448,
477–478 (2016).
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V Conclusions
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the interactions between
digital technologies and European Contract Law. The general architecture of
these interactions rests on three distinct yet interrelated pillars: 1) the regulatory
framework, which may even harness digital technology for regulatory purposes;
2) digital technology employed at different stages of the contractual life cycle,
from pre-contractual search, screening and signalling to drafting, formation and
performance, and even all the way to the linking and interpretation of contracts;
and finally 3) digital content as the object of (traditional or, more often, digitally
mediated) contracts.
We have tried to show that, as every good piece of architecture, the contrac-
tual digital architecture also subscribes to a certain narrative; it knows excep-
tions, but it nevertheless captures a tendency that will likely become ever more
impactful as digitization proceeds. We see four main storylines in this narrative
that all have to do with a growing interpenetration of different contractual para-
meters. First, national and global markets, contracting partners, and thus con-
tractual regimes become increasingly interlinked as services are exchanged, and
data is transferred, across borders, and as the regulatory environment is shaped
by global dynamics. Second, the contractual basis is subject to ever greater
modification and continuous updating over time; intelligent agents may even
adapt contractual provisions in real time as new information becomes available.
Third, the different stages of contracting, from the search for contractual partners
to formation and enforcement, and even interpretation, are increasingly linked by
digital processes in which feedback on, and predictions for, one or more of these
stages is directly implemented into the other stages, bringing the contractual life
cycle closer than ever to full circle. Fourth, in the supply of digital content, it is
becoming increasingly unclear which contractual obligation may be deemed
characteristic for the contract, and which a mere ‘counter-performance’; this
holds particularly true when this counter-performance is effectuated by the provi-
sion of personal data instead of money which, amazing enough, also brings back
exchange in kind in high volumes to a society which seemed to have left behind
such transactions as mass transactions for a long time. The normative discussion
on these transactions, particularly on the bases of evaluation, has only just
started.
Regulatory challenges arise at many different stages and levels of these
interlinking pieces of the architecture. We suppose that, as the processes under-
lying digital contracting become more fluid and interwoven, users will benefit
insofar as new information can be integrated into evolving contractual arrange-
ments; however, where this adaptive environment leads to severe imbalances of
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information, power, and agency, the ordering forces of the law may be more
needed than ever to provide for the safeguarding of core legal values in the digital
economy. After all, many important pieces of architecture include some version of
Iustitia in their narrative.
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